How can you plan in the absence of well-defined strategic objectives and a clearly defined desired end state (DES)? How do the military define their "measures of success"?
Strategic goals
“A person who is willing to care for tigers or to rush with a river, not caring whether he lived or died, is a person I should not take. I must certainly take someone who was very careful with the difficulties and preferred to succeed in strategy. "
Sun Tzu - The Art of War
The same strategic goal can cause different reactions in different people. These are clearly defined goals and desired outcomes that should facilitate strategic planning. A “strategic goal” is a political goal (for example, freedom from oppression, conquest of neighboring states, protection from rebels). Each military operation must be directed at clear, decisive and achievable goals. These goals or objectives should lead military operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. The national military strategy "directs the Armed Forces to the effective use of their resources to achieve the goals of national security and defense." (Joint Pub 1)
How can you plan in the absence of clearly defined strategic goals? In the absence of clearly defined goals or clear strategic goals, planners should double the latter with the desired end state (DES) and determine the assumptions so that they can start the process. Naval War Publication 5-01 defines assumptions as “an assumption about current situations or 1) that is said to be true in the absence of positive evidence or 2) it is necessary for the commander to complete an assessment of the situation during planning and make a decision on action or both. ” Although the assumption regarding strategic objectives is not the preferred method of searching for information, it will allow planners to begin the planning process. However, in order to start moving towards the desired end state, military leaders must constantly ask for clearly defined and achievable goals.
Desired end state
“In a strategic context, a military victory is measured in the achievement of a common political goal and its associated completion goals.”
Co-publish 3-0
Vego (2000) defines “Desired End State” (DES) as “broadly expresses the political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, ethnic, humanitarian and other conditions that top political leaders of national or allied coal forces want in this theater after the end of the military action. " Some military operations can be carried out to achieve a specific goal - a goal, but can represent only part of the DES. “Successful military operations alone cannot achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of military operations should be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national authority, such as political negotiations, and focused on common goals. "(Joint publication 3-0). So it was with the conflict of the Falkland Islands / Malvinas Islands. Argentina provided a well-defined military objective, which was to return the island Falkland / Malvinas, suppressing the British. However, their inability to identify DES allowed inadequate intelligence and relatively lack of follow-up planning. Gatchell (2001) states that “Argentine decisions or lack of [the] that the Argentines successfully completed their military mission, but did not provide any provisions for DES, such as robust protection against the UK. Gatchell continues and indicates why Britain was not forced to negotiate a settlement in connection with the Argentines, the absence of any strategic planning and the extreme absence of any strategy, hamstrung [their] forces, transferring the initiative to the enemy. "
Success against efficiency
“A political object — the initial motive of the war — will determine both the military goal to be achieved and the amount of effort it requires. However, a political object in itself cannot serve as a standard of measurement. ”
Karl von Clausewitz - On War (p. 81)
Military success measures must be established at the beginning of a mission to consistently assess progress, manage expectations, and facilitate the transition from one phase of the operation to another. But how do the military determine its degree of success in the absence of well-defined strategic objectives? Success is the achievement or fulfillment of a specific mission. Even with respect to the phases of hostilities, success claims that we are at or near the end of this stage or mission. However, efficiency not only takes into account the completion of the mission, but also the effectiveness of execution. A joint publication 3-57 describes efficiency measures (EMERCOM) in hostilities as “the tools used to measure the results achieved in a common mission and the fulfillment of objectives in comparison with the stated strategic and operational goals”. MOE helps commanders in determining the progress of the mission. The bottom line is whether the military efforts achieve the desired result. The Ministry of Emergency Situations provides commanders and higher authorities with basic indicators of how well the military achieve these goals. These measures are situational and usually require adjustment as the situation changes. The effective contribution of the MCH to the effectiveness of the mission by identifying effective points with which you can transfer resources, go to different stages or change or stop the mission. MES also helps the commander in determining when the mission was completed.
Development of efficiency measures
"Suffice it to say that the departure of the enemy from the battlefield is a sign of victory ... [For] a victory aimed at weakening the enemy’s combat forces differs from that intended only to capture a certain position. ”
Karl von Clausewitz - On War (p. 142)
There is no comprehensive checklist for developing the MES. It depends on the mission. However, commanders must take into account certain factors when developing and using the MES. Co-publishing 3-57 provides planners with points to consider when developing an MES:
- They must meet the goals. Do we get the desired result?
- They must be associated with the mission. If the mission is a hurricane, then the MES should help assess improvements in living standards, mortality and other related areas.
- They must be measurable and reflect clear established criteria and be issued to prevent misinterpretation.
- They should be moderate and reasonable. Avoid excessive, unreasonable and uncontrolled measures.
- They must respond to the power characteristics and accurately reflect the changes associated with joint actions.
“They should be useful for quickly detecting situational changes so that the commander can immediately and effectively respond.”
Conclusion
"The initial means of strategy is victory, that is, tactical success, and ultimately its goal is those objects that will lead directly to the world, to a greater or lesser extent."
Karl von Clausewitz - On War (p. 143)
Strategic goal, DES and MES are closely related. Everyone deals with the results. The strategic goal is a well-defined and achievable goal, DES is the preferred environment after the habitat, and the MES is how leaders evaluate the military efforts. Political and military leaders should work closely together to define strategic goals, desired end states, and efficiency measures. “The use of a military instrument of national authority as a component of the National Security Strategy requires the development of military objectives, which should be consistent with the relevant diplomatic, economic and informational objectives” (Joint Pub 0-2)
Recommendations
Gatchel, TL (2001) Operative art and theater-level solutions during the Falkland Islands / Malvinas conflict. US Naval College. Newport, RI. p. 15
Howard, M. and Paret, P. (1976) Carl von Clausewitz. About war. Princeton University. Princeton, NJ.
Co-publication 0-2. (2001) United Armed Forces (UNAAF). Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington DC I-11
Joint publication 1. (2000) Joint war of the armed forces of the United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington DC IV-3
Co-publication 3-0. (2001) The Doctrine of Joint Operations. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington DC I-11.
Co-publication 3-57. (2001) Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington DC III-9-III-11
Naval Warfare Publication 5-01. Naval operational planning (revision A.) Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Washington DC 4-5
Vego, M. (2000) Operational Warfare. Naval College. Newport, RI. p. 637
